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Summary
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have prompted Members of the
107th Congress to consider enhancing state and local response capabilities to better
prepare for terrorist attacks, particularly attacks involving weapons of mass
destruction.  At present, Congress authorizes several programs designed to help state
and local responders enhance their preparedness for terrorist attacks.  These programs
cover a range of activities, including emergency planning; training and equipment;
response to chemical and biological attacks; law enforcement; and public health. 
Since the September attacks, however, emergency managers and analysts have
asked Congress to address several issues in federal policy on state and local
preparedness.  Some frequently mentioned policy issues are:
Amount and Uses of Federal Assistance—Observers have urged Congress to
increase levels of financial and technical assistance available to states and localities.
Some observers have also asked for more flexibility with federal funds.  
Coordination of Federal Assistance—Preparedness programs administered by
various federal agencies often are not well coordinated, causing frustration among
state and local officials seeking assistance.  Some call for one federal office to
coordinate the content and availability of preparedness programs.
Preparedness Standards—Nongovernmental organizations working with FEMA
have developed voluntary standards for emergency preparedness.  Some observers
have urged Congress to support the use of standards by instructing FEMA to
undertake more research on preparedness standards and provide more assistance to
governments attempting to meet standards. 
Preparedness of the Medical Community—Observers have emphasized the need
to give public health agencies and hospitals a greater role in emergency planning and
increase their capability to respond to weapons of mass destruction. 
Mutual Aid Compacts—Compacts are not uncommon, but some observers
believe states and localities need to formalize and update their compacts.  
Joint Training Exercises—Observers argue that more joint training exercises are
needed to adequately prepare local, state, and federal responders for terrorist attacks.
Communications Infrastructure and Other Equipment—First responders may
need specialized equipment to respond to a terrorist attack, including an interoperable
communications system. 
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State and Local Preparedness for Terrorism:
Policy Issues and Options
Introduction
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have prompted Members of the
107th Congress to consider enhancing state and local response capabilities to better
prepare for terrorist attacks.  During the first session alone, more than two dozen bills
were introduced with provisions relating to state and local preparedness.  While the
federal government has resources at hand for responding to terrorist attacks, the
proximity of state and local responders ensures they will almost always be the first to
arrive at the site of an attack.  For this reason, the preparedness of state and local
governments has become a salient national issue.  
Preparedness is one of four phases of comprehensive emergency management
(CEM).  The other three phases are response, recovery, and mitigation.  CEM offers
emergency managers a framework for classifying and planning not only preparedness
activities, but all emergency management activities.  Preparedness involves a wide
range of activities such as developing flexible response plans, training and equipping
responders, and assessing a community’s vulnerabilities.1  
Congress has addressed the preparedness phase of emergency management by
authorizing several training and grant programs designed to help states and localities
enhance their response capabilities, particularly for terrorist attacks involving weapons
of mass destruction (WMD).  Federal programs cover a range of activities, including
emergency management and planning; training and equipment; preparation for WMD
attacks; law enforcement; and public health.2  
The possibility of terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) presents a unique challenge to state and local officials.  WMD may be defined
as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, conventional explosives,
or any device capable of causing mass casualties.  Adequately coping with an WMD
attack would require first responders to have special equipment and extensive
training.3  Such attacks would be more likely to overwhelm state and local response
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3(...continued)
officers, and public health officials.  
4U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related
Recommendations, GAO Report GAO-01-822 (Washington: Sept. 2001), pp. 97-98. 
5“Strengthening Homeland Security,” White House, press release, Jan. 24, 2002. 
capabilities than attacks not involving WMD.  Since preparing for WMD attacks is
an institutional and financial challenge for states and localities, federal assistance for
preparedness currently focuses on providing the planning, equipment, and training
necessary to respond to a WMD attack.  Officials from all levels of government,
however, have asked Congress to evaluate these assistance programs, suggesting they
are administered in a disorganized fashion.4 
Observers have also asked Congress to examine several issues in federal policy
on state and local emergency preparedness, including the lack of preparedness
standards, inadequate medical community preparedness, informal mutual aid
compacts, lack of joint training exercises, inadequate communications systems and
other equipment, and lack of model response plans.  
As mentioned, over two dozen bills addressing state and local preparedness for
terrorism were introduced in the first session of the107th Congress. (See the Appendix
for a list of these bills).  Some bills call for a national strategy on terrorism
preparedness and would include funding and technical assistance for states and
localities.  Among them are bills that exclusively address preparedness for chemical
and biological attacks.  In addition to these congressional proposals, the Bush
Administration will request $37.7 billion for homeland security in the FY2003 budget,
of which states and localities would be allocated a $3.5 billion as part of a “first
responder initiative.”5  Should they become law, these bills could have a direct impact
on state and local preparedness by providing additional funds and technical assistance
for preparedness activities, as well as establishing mechanisms for the federal
government to monitor and evaluate state and local activities.  
This report provides information and analysis intended to be useful to Congress
on legislation and oversight related to state and local emergency preparedness.
Specifically, this report provides a brief overview of the present condition of state and
local preparedness, analyzes selected issues in federal policy, and presents some of the
policy options available to Congress in addressing those issues.  
This report focuses on selected federal policies and activities that directly affect
states and localities, or if enacted, would directly affect them.  It is not a
comprehensive discussion of all federal policy issues involved with state and local
preparedness.  Examples of related issues not discussed in this report include
intelligence sharing between federal agencies and state and local governments, and the
role of specialized National Guard response units.  The report does not directly
address other phases of emergency management: response, recovery, and mitigation.
Although these other phases are briefly discussed in the report, they are not its
subject.
CRS-3
6U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations
Planning, SLG-101 (Washington: Sept. 1996), p. iii. 
7Waugh, Terrorism and Emergency Management, pp. 29-31. 
8Ibid., pp. 82-83. 
9The Gilmore Commission is formally known as the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic
Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction.  The name
“Gilmore Commission” comes from the name of the Chairman, former Governor James
Gilmore of Virginia.  The commission is charged with assessing the capabilities of federal,
state, and local governments for responding to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass
destruction.  Congress authorized the commission in Section 1405 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (P.L. 105-261).  See commission web site:
[http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/], visited Jan. 29, 2002. 
Overview of Emergency Preparedness
The following section provides a brief overview of emergency preparedness
practices that states and localities undertake to prepare for all disasters, including
terrorist attacks.  An understanding of these practices will be useful in analyzing the
federal policy issues discussed in this report.  
Preparedness Activities.  State and local officials, as well as the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), advocate an “all-hazard approach” to
emergency preparedness that stresses using existing institutions and plans to respond
to all disasters, including acts of terrorism.6  Preparedness activities can incorporate
the resources of local, regional, state, and federal agencies, as well as the medical
community, relief organizations, and the private sector.  Activities that comprise an
effective preparedness strategy include the following:  
! risk assessment;
! capability assessment, improvement, and maintenance;
! emergency planning; 
! training and exercises; and 
! incorporation of local, regional, state, and federal resources.7
One scholar of emergency management emphasizes the importance of risk
assessment as part of preparedness for terrorism.  It is necessary to identify persons,
structures, or locations in a community that are potential targets.  In addition, risk
assessment can include assessing the vulnerability of a community’s infrastructure,
such as power, water, communications, and transportation corridors.8
Inadequate preparation could lead to lack of a clear command structure,
inefficient use of intergovernmental resources, and, ultimately, increased loss of life
and property.  Emergency planners typically assume that local resources would be
overwhelmed in the event of a major terrorist attack and would require additional
regional, state, and possibly, federal resources.  Thus, the Gilmore Commission, which
Congress created in 1998, has emphasized the need for intergovernmental
coordination:9
CRS-4
10Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons
of Mass Destruction, Second Annual Report to The President and The Congress
(Washington: December, 2000), pp. 3-4, 23. 
11William A. Anderson and Shirley Mattingly, “Future Directions,” in Emergency
Management: Principles and Practice for Local Government, Thomas E. Drabek and Gerard
J. Hoetmer, eds. (Washington: International City Management Association, 1991), p. 323.
12Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons
of Mass Destruction, First Annual Report to The President and The Congress (Washington:
December, 1999), pp. ix-x. 
13Amy E. Smithson and Leslie-Anne Levy, Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism
Threat and the US Response, (Washington: October 2000), pp. 70-71.  Available at Stimson
Center web site: [http://www.stimson.org/pubs.cfm?ID=12], visited Jan. 18, 2002.  The Henry
L. Stimson Center is a research and analysis organization that addresses problems of national
and international security.  
Response to an attack must be layered and sequential: Local entities will respond
first, supplemented as necessary by State capabilities.  When local capabilities are
exceeded, the response shifts to the State (perhaps multi-state) level.  The Federal
response should come only after local and State capabilities are exceeded.10
Observers generally encourage states and localities to incorporate private
businesses in emergency planning.  They argue that private sector participation can
enhance preparedness by identifying potential hazards at business sites (such as
hazardous materials) and clarifying the role and responsibilities of private entities
during an emergency.  State and local emergency managers can also be helpful to
private businesses in developing and exercising evacuation plans.11  
State and Local Preparedness as Part of a National Strategy.  Even
before the attacks of September 2001, emergency managers and analysts were calling
for a national strategy that emphasized preparedness of state and local governments,
and integration of resources available at all levels of government.  The Gilmore
Commission reiterated this argument in its first report, calling for a national strategy
that respects the traditional public safety role of states and localities and that clearly
defines federal activities to support state and local responders.12  
Lessons from Previous Attacks.  Previous terrorist attacks illustrate the
need for state and local preparedness and for effective integration of
intergovernmental resources.  One of the most frequently studied attacks is the 1995
sarin gas attack in Tokyo’s subway system by a Japanese group called Aum Shinrikyo.
Although this terrorist attack did not occur in the United States, many observers
believe the response of first responders in Tokyo offers valuable lessons to U.S.
policymakers.13
Reports have consistently said that the Tokyo attack’s first responders were
unprepared to handle an emergency involving WMD.  The emergency medical
technicians (EMTs), firefighters, and police were not trained to recognize signs of
toxic exposure, and thus wore regular work clothing with no gear to protect them
from sarin gas (approximately 10% of the first responders reported non-life-
threatening injuries resulting from exposure).  Responding agencies took over 30
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14Smithson and Levy, Ataxia, pp. 91-92. 
15Ibid., pp. 108-109. 
16Ibid., p. 92. 
17Ibid., pp. 70-71.
18For more information on response to the anthrax attacks, see CRS Report RL31225,
Bioterrorism: Summary of a CRS/National Health Policy Forum Seminar on Federal, State,
and Local Public Health Preparedness, by Robin J. Strongin and C. Stephen Redhead. 
minutes to recognize the chemical threat and order responders to wear gas masks.
EMTs established a triage system, but did not decontaminate victims.  Law
enforcement officials also failed to secure the perimeter of the incident scene, allowing
unaffected commuters and onlookers to mingle with victims.  Further compounding
the problem, noise from media helicopters hovering near the scene interfered with
verbal communications.14
Reports also show that the intergovernmental response to the attack was
disorganized and inefficient.  One cited problem is that Japanese federal agencies
inserted personnel into response operations without any request from city officials.
Many of the federal officials had little or no experience in emergency response, but
insisted on participating.  Reportedly, this complicated the ability of local emergency
managers to control response operations.15
Besides the importance of state and local preparedness and integration of
intergovernmental resources, reports on the Tokyo attack also highlight the
importance of integrating public health agencies and hospitals into emergency
planning.  Tokyo’s medical community was not prepared to respond to a chemical
attack with mass casualties.  When the city requested backup personnel, many doctors
and nurses immediately set out for the incident scene.  They arrived to discover that
the most serious cases were en route to the hospital.  Victims arriving at the hospital
were not initially decontaminated, which exposed medical staff to small amounts of
sarin.  Some reports stated that the medical community did not adequately pass on
information about the attack to the media and government authorities, leaving the
public to speculate about the potential spread of sarin gas.  This may have contributed
to the onslaught of “psychogenic” patients on the Tokyo hospital system hours after
the initial response.  Psychogenic patients, also called the “worried well,” are
medically well citizens who suffer from anxiety about exposure and injury.16
Observers of emergency management in the United States have pointed to the
inefficient response to the Aum Shinrikyo attack as evidence of the importance of
state and local preparedness.17  Problems experienced during the response to the
recent anthrax attacks in the United States also yield evidence of its importance.
Observers cite such problems as lack of coordination and information sharing among
various responders, particularly public health officials and law enforcement officials,
and difficulty in communicating accurate and consistent information to the public.
Furthermore, public health analysts have stated that the attacks revealed significant
disparities in the public health system, including lack of monitoring capability.18  
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19Statement of Amy E. Smithson, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Reform,
Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental
Relations, A Silent War: Are Federal, State, and Local Governments Prepared for
Biological and Chemical Attacks?, hearings, 107th Cong., 1st sess., Oct. 5, 2001. 
20Statement of Janet Heinrich, U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Government Reform, hearings, Oct. 5, 2001. 
21The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-499, Title
III) required each state to create a State Emergency Response Commission, which, in turn,
created emergency planning districts and designated Local Emergency Planning Committees.
Although the state and local committees created by the act were designed to prepare
communities for chemical accidents, states and localities may use them to prepare for all
hazards.  For more information, see CRS Report RL30798, Environmental Laws: Summaries
of Statutes Administered by the Environmental Protection Agency, p. 80. 
Present Condition of State and Local Preparedness.  Since the attacks
of September 2001, congressional witnesses, as well as surveys of states and
localities, have yielded some observations on the present condition of state and local
preparedness.  The observations suggest that states and localities are generally
prepared for emergencies, but may need to modify existing response plans and
activities to better prepare for terrorist attacks involving WMD.  Amy E. Smithson
of the Stimson Center, for example, stated that “The bedrocks of chemical and
biological disaster preparedness already exist at the local and state levels.”  She
asserted that states and localities across the nation already have capable fire and
rescue departments, and law enforcement personnel.  There are also approximately
650 hazardous materials teams nationwide with specialists trained to respond to some
WMD incidents. Smithson argues, however, that better intergovernmental
coordination is needed and state and local capabilities need to be further enhanced.19
Other witnesses have testified about weaknesses they found in state and local
preparedness.  A primary concern has been the ability of state and local governments
to respond to WMD incidents.  Janet Heinrich of the U.S. General Accounting Office,
for example, stated, “ ...[W]e found emerging concerns about the preparedness of
state and local jurisdictions, including insufficient state and local planning for response
to terrorist events ....”20  A number of witnesses have expressed similar views, and
presented other concerns, including the lack of joint federal-state-local training
exercises, lack of standardized communications equipment, and lack of private-sector
involvement in emergency planning.
Surveys of states and localities conducted after the September 2001 attacks
support the belief that states and localities are generally prepared for emergencies, but
may need to modify existing emergency management institutions and activities to
prepare for acts of terrorism involving WMD.  The National Emergency Management
Association (NEMA) conducted surveys of state-level preparedness following the
September 2001 attacks.  NEMA found that every state had a response plan and an
emergency preparedness coordinating body in place before the attacks.21  At least 14
states, however, have since created new preparedness offices or coordinator positions,
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22National Emergency Management Association, “Trends in State Terrorism Preparedness,”
Executive Summary, December 2001, no pagination.  Available at NEMA web site:
[http://www.nemaweb.org]. 
23National League of Cities, “Terrorism Preparedness Survey,” September 21, 2001, no
pagination, available at NLC web site: [http://www.nlc.org], visited October 2, 2001; and,
National Association of Counties, “Counties Secure America: A Survey of Emergency
Preparedness of the Nation’s Counties,” December 2001, available at NACO web site:
[http://www.naco.org], visited Jan. 3, 2002. 
and at least 18 states have created advisory panels to address terrorism
preparedness.22
Surveys by the National League of Cities (NLC) and National Association of
Counties (NACO) show similar results at the local level.  Before September 2001, the
vast majority of cities and counties had disaster response plans in place.  The surveys,
however, revealed a disparity in preparedness between urban localities and rural
localities.  Whereas approximately 80% of cities and urban counties address WMD
attacks in their response plans, less than half of towns and rural counties do so.  This
disparity also applies to terrorism training.  Whereas approximately 57% of large
cities had received terrorism training in the past year, approximately half as many
small cities had received terrorism training.23  
Selected Policy Issues and Policy Options
Both before and after the September 2001 attacks, but especially since,
emergency managers and analysts have identified several issues in federal policy on
state and local preparedness.  On the whole, they have not called for new institutions
or response plans, but, rather, for enhancing current institutions and plans to better
address the unique threat of terrorism.  Some of the most frequently identified policy
issues include:
! amount and uses of federal assistance;
! coordination of federal assistance;
! preparedness standards;
! preparedness of the medical community;
! mutual aid compacts;
! joint training exercises;
! communications systems and other equipment; and
! model response plans. 
This is not a comprehensive list of policy issues, but, rather, a list of some of
those most frequently cited by emergency managers and analysts.  For each of these
policy issues there is a discussion below of policy options that Congress could
consider.  These policy issues and options do not depend on each other, and Congress
can factor in issues of budget, federalism, and other policy concerns in choosing the
direction of federal policy.  Each policy option is followed by a discussion of
consequences that could result from its adoption. 
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24U.S. OMB, Annual Report, FY2001, p. 23. 
25National Governor’s Association, “NGA Releases State Homeland Security Survey
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Amount and Uses of Federal Assistance
Defining the Issue.  Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, emergency
managers and analysts have urged Congress to increase levels of financial and
technical assistance to states and localities to enhance their preparedness for terrorist
attacks.  Although public safety is traditionally a state and local function, Congress
may consider increasing assistance if it determines that the desired preparedness
improvements could overwhelm state and local resources, interfering with their ability
to provide basic services.  It also may reconsider the range of eligible grant activities
and examine the potential for state and local over-dependence on federal funds. 
Amount of Funding Needed.  The Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) estimates that, in FY2001, the federal government expended approximately
$367.5 million on state and local preparedness for terrorism.  OMB classifies the
spending into four general categories, which are listed in the table below.
Table 1. OMB Estimates of Federal Spending for 




First Responder Training and Exercises $223
Medical Responder Training and Exercises $2
Other Planning and Assistance to States and Localities
(mostly assistance for medical responders)
$29.1
Equipment for First Responders $113.4
FY2001 Total $367.5
Source: Office of Management and Budget, Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism,
FY2001 (Washington: 2001), pp. 21-24. 
Emergency managers and analysts contend that this amount should be
significantly increased to help states and localities enhance their capability to respond
to future terrorist attacks.  Public health agencies, for example, have been consistently
cited as needing more financial resources to adequately prepare for chemical and
biological attacks.  OMB’s report indicates that the $31 million for medical responder
training (see table 1, Medical Responder Training and Other Planning funds) most
likely will not be enough funding to match demand by state and local public health
agencies and other medical responders.24 
The National Governor’s Association (NGA) has requested $4 billion from
Congress for states alone.  NGA says states will use these funds to improve
bioterrorism preparedness, emergency communications, and security of critical
infrastructure.25  Representing the local level, the U.S. Conference of Mayors and
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Results,” press release (Washington: December, 2001), available at NGA web site:
[http://www.nga.org], visited Jan. 3, 2002. 
26See U.S. Conference of Mayors, A National Action Plan for Safety and Security in
America’s Cities (Washington: December 2001), p. 8, available at USCM web site:
[http://www.usmayors.org], visited Jan. 15, 2002; and National League of Cities, “City
Leaders Demand a Full Partnership in Homeland Security,” press release, December 6, 2001,
available at NLC web site: [http://www.nlc.org], visited Jan. 8, 2002. 
27For a listing of existing programs, see CRS Report RL31227, Terrorism Preparedness: A
Catalog of Federal Assistance Programs, coordinated by Ben Canada.
28For more information on block grants, see CRS Report RL30818, Block Grants: An
Overview, by Eugene Boyd and Ben Canada. 
29U.S. Conference of Mayors, A National Plan, p. 8. 
National League of Cities have requested additional funding for cities and towns,
although not a specific amount.  They argue that committing more local resources to
preparedness could interfere with cities’ ability to provide basic services.26
Range of Eligible Activities.  Whether or not Congress increases assistance,
it could re-evaluate the range of eligible activities for which states and localities can
use federal funds.  At present, all federal preparedness grants are categorical in nature,
meaning that recipient governments may only use the funds for specific activities.  At
present, Congress authorizes several categorical grant programs for such activities as:
! emergency management and planning;
! training and equipment for first responders;
! weapons of mass destruction and hazardous materials training;
! law enforcement; and
! public health and medical community.27 
If Congress determined that states and localities needed greater flexibility in the
use of funds, an alternative would be consolidating the existing categorical programs
into a block grant.28  An emergency preparedness block grant could give states and
localities considerable discretion in the use of funds, allowing them to commit federal
resources to self-identified needs and to improve their unique preparedness plans.  
Whether Congress chooses to distribute preparedness funds as block grants or
categorical grants, it could consider what portion of funds should go to states and
what portion to localities.  The U.S. Conference of Mayors argues that the majority
of federal preparedness funds goes to states, leaving little for localities.29  To address
this concern, Congress could consult with state and local officials to determine what
level of government could use federal resources most effectively and efficiently.
Alternatively, it could instruct an appropriate federal agency, such as FEMA or GAO,
to evaluate which level of government has the greatest need based on risk assessment
and available financial resources.
Were Congress to expand the range of eligible grant activities, one approach
would be to authorize recipients to use funds for hazard mitigation activities.
CRS-10
30For more information, see FEMA’s Project Impact web site: [http://www.fema.gov/impact/]
and Hazard Mitigation Grants Program web site: [http://www.fema.gov/mit/hmgp/], visited
Jan. 15, 2002.
31For more information on matching requirements and maintenance-of-efforts provisions, see
CRS Report RL30778, Federal Grants to State and Local Governments: Concepts for
Legislative Design and Oversight, pp. 6-8. 
32For more information on flexibility and accountability in grant programs, see CRS Report
RL30778, Federal Grants to State and Local Governments: Concepts for Legislative Design
and Oversight, pp. 14-17.  
Whereas preparedness involves planning, training, and equipping for disaster
response, hazard mitigation involves reducing the possibility of disaster or reducing
the extent of damage when a disaster strikes.  Activities can include protective
construction methods and altering public travel patterns.  These activities complement
preparedness activities and would assist governments in executing a comprehensive
emergency management plan.  At present, Congress authorizes FEMA to distribute
mitigation funds through its Hazard Mitigation Grants Programs (HMPG) and Project
Impact.30  If it chose this option, it could clarify in legislation whether these mitigation
grants could be used to address man-made as well as natural disasters.  
Potential Consequences.  One potential consequence of increasing federal
assistance is that states and localities could become overly dependent on federal funds.
Emergency management is traditionally a state and local activity supplemented by
federal resources. Were Congress to increase funding for state and local preparedness,
recipient governments might begin to regard federal grants as a permanent and
predictable source of funding.  If, in the future, Congress decided to decrease financial
assistance for preparedness, states and localities could then have difficulty
compensating for decreasing federal grants.
To address this concern, Congress could include a matching requirement or
maintenance-of-effort provision in federal programs.  Among other purposes, these
provisions are intended to ensure that recipient governments do not become overly
dependent on federal funds.31  Alternatively, Congress could limit the use of funds to
only short-term activities, such as training exercises and capital purchases, and
prohibit the use of funds for salaries, maintenance, and other recurring expenses.
Were Congress to give states and localities more flexibility in their use of federal
funds, it might impede its ability to oversee the efficiency and effectiveness of federal
programs.  Grant programs that give recipients a high degree of flexibility, such as
block grants, are often hard to evaluate and can make congressional oversight
difficult. On the other hand, categorical grant programs with a narrow range of
eligible activities and specific objectives offer recipients little flexibility, but are easier
to evaluate.32
Coordination of Federal Assistance
Defining the Issue.  At present, grants and training programs for first
responders are offered by agencies within the Departments of Defense, Health and
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Human Services, Justice, and FEMA.  Some of the programs focusing on first
responder preparedness (commonly known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici programs)
have been transferred from one department to another.  The multiplicity of agencies
offering assistance, and subsequent shifting of agency responsibilities seems to have
led to frustration and confusion among state and local officials attempting to secure
federal funds.  In addition, state and local officials argue that the application process
is burdensome and inconsistent among federal agencies.33
Designate One Coordinating Office?  Some argue that the organization
and administration of programs among the federal agencies would benefit from the
designation of one office or agency to monitor and coordinate all federal preparedness
programs.  For example, this office might be tasked to undertake several activities to
better address state and local needs, including: 
! maintain a one-stop “clearinghouse” of assistance programs;
! ensure that relevant agencies advertise accurate information on their programs;
! monitor the content and availability of training courses;
! monitor use of funds by recipients to ensure congressional (and executive
branch) goals are being met; and
! suggest measures for streamlining the application process. 
Some of these activities, such as evaluation of application processes and
monitoring use of funds by recipients, might also be appropriate for federal agencies,
such as FEMA, GAO, or other relevant agencies.  
An existing office could carry out a role as lead coordinator of federal
preparedness programs.  Two possibilities are FEMA’s Office of National
Preparedness and the new Office of Homeland Security.  In early 2001, the Bush
Administration, in response to state and local concerns, created the Office of National
Preparedness within FEMA and charged it with coordinating all programs concerned
with possible impacts of WMD attacks.34  FEMA considers emergency preparedness
a core element of its mission.  The agency already administers preparedness programs
through its Emergency Management Institute and other grant programs.  On the other
hand, the Office of Homeland Security, which has been charged with coordinating a
national strategy on terrorism preparedness, would be another option for designation
as lead coordinating office.35  At the time of writing, however, questions about this
office’s mission, authority, and budget have not been resolved.36
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Existing Standards, Assessments, and Accreditation Processes
The National Fire Protection Association’s code 1600 establishes standards for emergency planning and
capabilities.  The code organizes the standards into 13 emergency management functions.  It is designed to apply
to any public or private entity that is required to develop emergency response plans by legislation, regulation, or
agency policy.  While the standards are voluntary, they are commonly accepted standards and would likely be the
standards applied in any legal action involving a government's emergency response. 
FEMA's Capability Assessment for Readiness (CAR) is a self-assessment process for state-level emergency
management agencies to use to evaluate their own readiness.  The CAR process is presently being pilot-tested for
use at the local level.  The process, which is organized around the same 13 emergency management functions used
in NFPA 1600, is intended to help states develop strategic goals to improve their readiness.  While governments
can conduct the assessment on their own, they are encouraged to work with the FEMA regional office.  
The Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP), which is administered by the National
Emergency Management Association,  is a structured, independent evaluation process that requires agencies seeking
accreditation to undergo FEMA’s Capability Assessment for Readiness (CAR) process.  EMAP, however, requires
documentation and outside review to ensure the agency has effectively undergone the self-assessment.  Accreditation
is meant to provide a means of identifying agencies that meet national standards and offers a strategy for continuous
improvement. EMAP is in its pilot phase and is expected to be made available to state and local agencies later in
2002. 
Source: Publications by the National Fire Protection Association, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and
National Emergency Management Association. 
Congress could also assign the coordinating function to another relevant agency.
Another available option would be to create a new agency to concentrate on
homeland security, which could be tasked to coordinate preparedness programs.  
Potential Consequence.  Designating one coordinating office could result
in a transfer of responsibilities from several federal agencies to that office.  The
agencies from which the responsibilities were transferred could find this a detriment
to their mission effectiveness, depending on how integrated the transferred
responsibilities were with other functions.  It is also possible that the transferred
responsibilities might require the receiving office to have increased administrative
capacity to fulfill its mission.  
Preparedness Standards  
Defining the Issue.  Preparedness standards are specified activities and levels
of competence that state and local responders are encouraged to achieve and
maintain.  The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), National Emergency
Management Association (NEMA), and FEMA have worked together to develop
voluntary standards; encourage states and localities to assess their competency based
on those standards; and undergo an accreditation process.  Standards have been
developed for most emergency management functions, from broad functions like
response planning to specific functions like response to hazardous materials incidents.
Some emergency managers and analysts have encouraged Congress to support
nationwide standards, which they believe could better prepare states and localities for
not only terrorist attacks but all emergencies.
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Using Preparedness Standards and Assessments?  Support of such
standards would use federal resources to better prepare existing state and local
institutions for acts of terrorism.  To improve preparedness in this manner, Congress
could authorize FEMA to increase its financial and technical assistance available to
states and localities for meeting preparedness standards.  In 1999, the Gilmore
Commission emphasized the need for research on preparedness standards, concluding,
... that national standards for responders at all levels, particularly for planning,
training, and equipment, are critical, and [we recommend] that more emphasis be
placed on research, development, testing, and evaluation in the adoption of such
standards.37 
Congress could direct FEMA to coordinate and support ongoing research on
standards and assessments, which is currently being conducted by several
nongovernmental organizations. 
An alternative would be to require standards by conditioning the receipt of
federal funds on satisfying preparedness standards set forth by FEMA.38  As long as
funding was included that would allow the recipient to comply with the requirements,
Congress would avoid creating an unfunded mandate.39  Congress established a
precedent for such action in Title VI of the Stafford Act, which provides funding to
states for emergency preparedness activities.  Under the Stafford Act, Congress gives
the FEMA director discretion in placing conditions on the use of grant funds,
including the method of purchase, quantity of items, and specifications of equipment.
States must also satisfy specified requirements, such as developing statewide response
plans, appointing a full-time state emergency manager, and reporting to the FEMA
director on a regular basis.40
Potential Consequences.  Although FEMA and some nongovernmental
organizations are working to implement voluntary standards, congressional support
could expedite, and better ensure, that states and localities institutionalize the
standards.  One congressional witness testified on institutionalizing standards: 
The prerequisite for institutionalization is standards, and all of the response
disciplines—fire, police, EMS, hospital care providers—expressed an abundance
of frustration over the absence of standards and protocols to guide them.
Standards command the attention of rescue and healthcare personnel because they
are the backbone of accountability.41 
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While implementing standards could provide potential benefits, Congress might
want to consider some potential effects that could result from requiring state and local
preparedness standards.  
Were Congress not only to support standards but also to require recipients of
federal grants to meet specified standards, states and localities could be deterred from
accepting federal funds.  It is possible that some governments might decline federal
preparedness grants and maintain their existing standards or other contingency plans
since, even with federal assistance, meeting the standards could prove prohibitively
expensive.  This consequence might be more likely in smaller localities that rely
predominately on volunteer fire and rescue squads, which typically have limited
financial resources, and in states and localities that believe they are at little risk of
terrorist attacks.  On the other hand, considering the nationwide salience of the issue
of terrorism preparedness and the fact that many states are experiencing significant
budget difficulties, both states and localities would likely be eager for federal
assistance.42
Another potential consequence is that mandated standards could discourage
innovative state and local planning.  Each state has unique communities, which might
require unique planning arrangements.  If states and localities have flexibility in
preparing for terrorist attacks and other emergencies, there is potential for innovative
ideas that may benefit other areas.  One state-level emergency manager addressed this
issue in his testimony before the House Government Reform Committee: 
We would ask that not only would the national strategy respect the principals of
federalism, but would allow for state and local governments to address unique
communities and constituencies.  In particular, state and local governments are
often called “laboratories of democracy” because of their ability to experiment
quickly with policy and to find true best practices that would work for other state
and local jurisdictions as well as the federal government.43  
Preparedness of the Medical Community 
Defining the Issue.  Since the September 2001 attacks, emergency managers
and analysts have stressed to Congress the need to improve the preparedness of public
health agencies and hospitals.  As is the case with other first responders, such as
firefighters, emergency medical technicians (EMTs), and law enforcement personnel,
they have called for improvements in the existing public health infrastructure to
prepare not only for acts of terrorism but also for more conventional public health
emergencies, such as influenza epidemics.  One congressional witness, speaking on
behalf of the National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO)
expressed this concern, stating, “Local health departments lack arrangements with a
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wide range of health professionals and organizations essential for emergency
preparedness.”44 
Some state and local officials have suggested that if the medical community were
more involved in state and local emergency planning, communities would be more
prepared for the wide range of possible scenarios that terrorist attacks may present.
The American Hospital Association (AHA) states, “Hospital preparedness for
disasters has focused historically on a narrow range of potential incidents.  To
increase their preparedness for mass casualties, hospitals have to expand their focus
to include both internal and community-level planning.”  At a conference on mass
casualty response, the AHA recommended that hospitals seek more collaboration with
community leaders and seek a more active role in emergency planning.  The AHA
further recommended that hospitals establish relationships with relevant nonprofit
organizations, state and federal emergency management agencies, and other
proximate hospitals.45
Observers also believe the public health infrastructure is inadequate for dealing
with WMD attacks and mass casualties, particularly biological attacks.46  Whereas
explosives and chemical attacks cause immediate and visible injuries, bioterrorism may
go unrecognized over time.  The speed with which health officials detect an epidemic
and the adequacy of quarantine plans would directly affect the number of casualties.47
One report on public health and hospital preparedness for WMD in the United
States found many shortcomings.  For example, EMS personnel reported that, despite
procedures requiring decontamination of patients in hazardous materials incidents,
over 80% of such victims arrive at hospitals still contaminated.  In addition, the
nation’s hospitals are generally not required to have a standing capacity to
decontaminate a small number, much less a large number, of victims.  Some personnel
working in hospitals with decontamination capabilities reported that such scenarios
were not regularly drilled.48  
Involvement of Public Health Agencies and Hospitals.  State and local
grant recipients could be required to include public health agencies, hospitals, and
other medical institutions in emergency planning.  If this became a requirement, many
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public officials believe Congress would consider the expense this would add to
medical institutions’ costs and possibly offer grants to medical institutions for
emergency planning, equipment, and training and exercising, to enhance their
preparedness for WMD and mass casualty situations. 
Some observers of emergency management have emphasized the need to
institutionalize standards not only in traditional first responder units, but also the
medical community.  One state-level emergency manager supported such action in his
congressional testimony, stating hospitals should agree to maintain standardized levels
of resources and capabilities for handling mass casualties, especially those
contaminated by chemical and biological agents.49  One option for achieving
adherence to standards would be to require medical institutions that receive federal
funds to meet standards.
Potential Consequence.  Whereas public health agencies are government
institutions and can be instructed by policymakers to participate in emergency
planning, states and localities might have difficulty involving private hospitals.
Federal grants for preparedness activities, however, might serve as an incentive to
private and nonprofit hospitals to participate in state and local emergency planning.
This option has been recommended by some emergency managers who have testified
before Congress.50
Mutual Aid Compacts
Defining the Issue.  Mutual aid compacts are agreements between different
units of government to provide assistance in the event that an emergency overwhelms
one government’s response capability.  They can enhance preparedness by pooling
resources of several governments and overcoming legal and administrative problems
created by multi-jurisdictional boundaries.51  Since state and local governments
commonly participate in compacts, public officials have not identified it as a
significant gap in federal policy, but some observers have urged Congress to support
compacts and encourage states and localities to formalize and update their compacts,
and test them in training exercises.
There are two main types of compacts: regional (or intrastate) and interstate
compacts.  Emergency managers and analysts have suggested that regional compacts,
in particular, can enhance preparedness.  One cited benefit is that response teams for
chemical or biological incidents, which are expensive to train and equip, can be shared
by multiple localities.  One analyst conducted an extensive series of interviews with
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state and local emergency managers and reported that, since proximity of resources
is a crucial element in response, they generally relied on local and regional resources
during a response.  Some of the interviewees had “major reservations about the ability
of federal and even state assets to arrive in sufficient time to impact the outcome of
a chemical terrorist attack response.”52  One state-level emergency manager
summarized some of the benefits in his testimony before Congress: “In short, the
regional approach gives us a flexible response capability, both regionally and
nationally, which can adapt to catastrophic events as they occur and most effectively
use the limited resources we share.”53  
Interstate mutual aid compacts also have potential benefits.  Although out-of-
state resources might not have the close proximity of local resources, a state would
require assistance if an emergency overwhelms its resources.  The largest interstate
mutual aid compact is the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC),
which was developed in response to the devastation of Hurricane Andrew in Florida
in 1992.  Congress approved the compact in a joint resolution in 1996.54  At present,
43 states participate in EMAC.55  The compact facilitates interstate assistance by
establishing a clear procedure for requesting assistance, removing legal obstacles,
providing for reimbursement of services, and providing a framework for flexible
response.  Although states have requested assistance through EMAC to respond to
natural disasters, at the time of writing, no state has requested assistance through this
channel in response to terrorist attacks.56 
Use of Compacts?  Congress could condition the receipt of federal grants on
state governments organizing and formalizing regional mutual aid compacts to cover
every locality in their state.  While most localities throughout the United States are
already signatories of mutual aid compacts, some observers argue that states and
localities rely too often on informal agreements and should formalize their compacts.57
Advocates assert that by formalizing compacts in a written contract, state and local
governments can better prepare for response by eliminating potential legal and
administrative obstacles.  A written agreement can also help emergency managers by
providing a menu of resources available for response.58  Congress could promote such
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compacts, if it concurred in this view, by conditioning federal funds on a state’s
progress toward this goal.  
Congress could also require, as a condition of receiving federal funds, those
states that are not members of EMAC to join the compact.  This could remove legal
and administrative obstacles involved in inter-state mutual assistance to or from these
states.  Congress might also support research on ways of further incorporating EMAC
into federal response activities.  Some proponents argue that increased use of
interstate resources could relieve the strain on federal resources not only during
response to terrorist attacks but all disasters.  
Potential Consequence.  The creation and formalization of mutual aid
compacts might impose an administrative and financial burden on states and localities.
To address this situation, Congress might consider allowing preparedness grants to
be used for compacts, or instruct federal agencies to increase the availability of
technical assistance in developing compacts.  Opponents might argue, however, that
such an instruction would divert federal resources from other state and local needs.
Joint Training Exercises
Defining the Issue.  Joint training exercises are simulated response exercises
that involve federal, state, and local responders.  Joint training can improve
emergency preparedness by allowing responders from different agencies and different
levels of government to become familiar with others’ capabilities and practices.  It can
also give emergency managers an opportunity to rehearse response scenarios using
a range of intergovernmental resources.  
The conclusions of the After Action Report for the 1995 Oklahoma City
bombing offer some evidence of the importance of joint training.  The report noted
that the response effort was initially weakened by the lack of coordination and
communications from the responding local, state, and federal agencies.59  Proponents
believe training exercises can prevent the types of problems local, state, and federal
emergency managers experienced in the early stages of response in Oklahoma City.
At present, FEMA participates in over 200 state-level terrorism preparedness
exercises each year.  According to GAO, that number is up from approximately 25 in
FY1996 and continues to rise.  Many of the exercises are “tabletop exercises,” in
which participants discuss how their agency would respond to a particular type of
incident.  Some exercises are more demanding “full-scale exercises,” which require
responders to be deployed in the field and involve extensive evaluations.60  
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In addition to these exercises, there have been a limited number of nationwide
exercises in recent years involving emergency managers and elected officials from
around the nation.  In May 2000, for example, FEMA and the Department of Justice
conducted the TOPOFF (top officials) exercise, the largest joint training exercise of
its kind.  TOPOFF simulated WMD attacks in three locations across the nation.  The
Justice Department rated the exercise as a success, claiming to draw useful lessons
from it.61  In congressional testimony, a spokesman for (National Emergency
Management Association) NEMA concurred with the Justice Department that the
exercise was useful, but that similar exercises were necessary “to ensure that valuable
federal, state, and local relationships and trust are built before a disaster.”  The Justice
Department is currently planning for TOPOFF II, which is to be conducted in
FY2002.62
While FEMA officials believe exercises are an essential component of
preparedness, they argue that response to natural disasters can be just as valuable as
WMD training exercises.  Floods, hurricanes, and wildfires test the capabilities of
federal, state, and local responders and may lead to improved response to terrorist
attacks.
Despite these activities, some emergency managers and analysts believe that the
federal government does not coordinate or fund enough joint training exercises,
leaving a gap in federal policy.  In a survey by the Gilmore Commission, 80% of
responding localities stated they had not participated in an exercise with federal
agencies.  Additionally, a majority of localities reported that they had never held a
WMD response exercise.  The Gilmore Commission and other observers have
encouraged Congress to instruct FEMA to coordinate more joint exercises and to
provide more funding to states and localities to fund the exercises.63 
Are More Exercises Needed?  Should Congress determine more joint
training exercises are needed, it could direct FEMA to coordinate more exercises for
state and local officials and first responders.  Exercises could be structured to test and
evaluate existing state and local response plans as well as mutual aid compacts.
FEMA might also provide technical assistance to states and localities for exercise
development.  Such assistance could be useful to governments developing new
exercises for WMD response or enhancing existing exercises.
Potential Consequences.  There is arguably no adverse consequence in
supporting joint training exercises.  Holding exercises, however, particularly full-scale
exercises, can be prohibitively costly for state and local governments.
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Some state and local officials might disapprove of requirements for exercises.
Officials in rural communities, for example, might argue that such requirements would
divert resources from preparing for more likely natural disasters to preparing for less
likely terrorist attacks.  Should Congress decide to promote exercises, it might
instruct FEMA to conduct exercises in rural communities (or communities considered
“low risk”) less frequently than in urban communities.
Communications Infrastructure and Other Equipment
Defining the Issue.  According to emergency managers and analysts, the lack
of a policy on emergency communications infrastructure is a significant issue in
federal policy.  Observers have stated that an interoperable communications
infrastructure (a system that may be used by multiple jurisdictions) is one of the most
urgent equipment needs.  The president of the International Association of Fire Chiefs
testified before Congress on this need, stating, “In major incidents where the
responding emergency personnel involved come from different jurisdictions or
agencies, each using its own radio frequencies, the issue of radio communications
among and between responding agencies remains a challenge.”64  
After-action reports from the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and 1995
Oklahoma City bombing emphasized the need for communications infrastructure that
is common across jurisdictional boundaries.  These reports further recommended that
states and localities obtain backup communications systems, should the main system
fail.65  The American Hospital Association (AHA) has also emphasized the need for
standardized communications infrastructure, stating, “Recent disasters have
demonstrated that different organizations may use different media and/or different
frequencies in their communications.  Unable to communicate with one another,
precious time can be lost at the start of a mass casualty incident.”66  
Communications equipment, however, is not the only equipment need identified
by observers.  Emergency responders use a wide range of specialized equipment to
rescue and treat victims as well as protect themselves from injury.  Obtaining and
maintaining necessary equipment may enhance the ability of first responders to handle
WMD incidents.  Some observers have criticized the process by which states and
localities obtain WMD-response equipment and the lack of standards for such
equipment. 
In June 1999, GAO reported that some states and localities were purchasing
equipment for their jurisdictions without performing a risk assessment, which could
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identify the most useful equipment.  In its report, GAO emphasized the importance
of risk assessment, stating, “... [A] critical component of establishing and expanding
programs to combat terrorism is an analytically sound threat and risk assessment using
valid inputs from the intelligence community and other agencies.”  Concerning
equipment standards, GAO observed that federal, state, and local governments have
little consensus on the types of equipment needed to respond to WMD incidents.67
Standardization of Emergency Communications Infrastructure.
Some observers have suggested that the federal government assist states and localities
in providing an interoperable communications system that would allow responders
from multiple jurisdictions to communicate with one another as well as with out-of-
state jurisdictions.  Some emergency managers and analysts believe that the federal
government should research cost-effective means of procuring common bandwidths
and equipment that would enable multi-jurisdictional communication.  Congress could
also stipulate that communications equipment purchased with federal funds must meet
a set of established standards.  
Establishing Standards for Equipment.  According to GAO, an FBI-
directed commission has developed a list of standardized equipment for response to
WMD incidents that is intended to promote standardization among responders at all
levels of government.  The NFPA has also developed criteria for evaluating
equipment.  Both the FBI and NFPA lists are voluntary, leaving states and localities
discretion in choosing equipment types, manufacturers, and quantities.68  
To improve the process by which equipment is selected, appropriate federal
agencies might increase technical assistance to states and localities to conduct risk
assessments.  It is likely, however, that some communities do not have the
administrative capacity to undertake their own risk analysis, and would seek
additional federal resources.
Potential Consequence.  Mandating equipment standards could prove costly
to state and local governments even if additional federal resources were available.
The acquisition and maintenance of specialized equipment, including new
communications infrastructure, could pose a significant financial burden.  This
consequence may be more likely in smaller localities, or rural localities that rely
predominately on volunteer fire and rescue squads.  It is likely that any effort to
standardize would need to consider the impact on such communities.  
Model Plans and Best Practices
Defining the Issue.  Many emergency managers and analysts believe
promoting model plans and best practices in emergency preparedness would
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complement any other policy initiatives undertaken and could be beneficial to states
and localities.  This option arguably has no adverse consequences and also presents
a cost-effective means of assisting states and localities. 
Promote Best Practices.  FEMA could expedite its role in identifying and
promoting “model” state and local emergency plans that could serve as examples for
others to follow.  The Gilmore Commission recommended this policy option, citing
several states that have developed excellent response plans that could be used as
models for other states.  The commission further suggested that FEMA and NEMA
develop a model state plan that contained certain standard features, but remained
flexible enough to fit individual states’ circumstances.69
In addition to model response plans, Congress could emphasize “best practices”
in areas such as regional mutual aid compacts, medical community preparedness, and
joint training exercises.  States and localities that have excelled in these activities
could serve as examples for other governments across the nation.  Observers of
emergency management have called for Congress to support state and local efforts in
these areas.  NEMA, for example, has stated, “Interstate and intrastate mutual aid
assistance must be recognized and supported by the federal government as an
expedient, cost-effective approach to disaster response and recovery.”70
Preparedness activities undertaken in communities with special facilities, such as
nuclear power plants and chemical stockpiles are also of interest to Congress.  Since
1980, it has required all nuclear power plants to have emergency response plans as a
condition of license.71  The subsequent regulations list specific components for such
plans, including:
! clear assignment of responsibilities to state and local response agencies;
! arrangements for mutual assistance;
! procedures for notifying government agencies and the public of emergency;
! means of controlling radiological exposure; and
! periodic exercises and evaluations of response capability.72  
Congress also requires U.S. Army facilities with chemical stockpiles to have
preparedness plans.  Under the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
(CSEPP), these plans must not only incorporate the U.S. Army and FEMA, but also
state and local response agencies.  FEMA encourages CSEPP communities to take
a comprehensive approach to planning for a chemical accident and develop plans that
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address the unique needs of each community.  CSEPP communities typically test their
preparedness plans in periodic exercises.73  
Because some of the potential dangers of a nuclear or chemical stockpile
accident are similar to the dangers of a WMD attack (e.g., radiological exposure),
activities in such communities with special facilities may be relevant to current efforts
and help identify the most efficient and effective preparedness plans.  Other states and
localities could be encouraged to follow those examples as they prepare for potential
WMD attacks.  
Conclusion
The unprecedented terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have prompted
policymakers at all levels of government to consider how to prepare for possible
future attacks.  Congress might address any, or all, of these policy issues as it seeks
ways to enhance existing emergency response institutions and plans to better prepare
for future attacks.  Should Congress consider legislation on state and local
preparedness, it would have a wide range of options to consider.
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Appendix: State and Local Preparedness Bills
This appendix lists bills introduced in the 107th Congress specifically related to
state and local emergency preparedness.  The title, sponsor, and a description of the
provisions relating to state and local preparedness are provided for each bill.  Bill
provisions not directly related to state and local preparedness have been omitted.  
National Strategy Proposals 
H.R. 525 (Gilchrest).  Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act of 2001.
Bill establishes the President's Council on Domestic Preparedness and requires it to
establish voluntary minimum guidelines for preparedness programs.
H.R. 1158 (Thornberry). National Homeland Security Agency Act.  Bill
establishes a National Homeland Security Agency.  It requires the agency’s director
to work with state and local governments and executive agencies in protecting U.S.
homeland security and support state officials through the use of regional offices
around the country.  The agency will provide overall planning guidance to federal
agencies regarding homeland security and develop a federal response plan for
homeland security and emergency preparedness.
H.R. 1292 (Skelton).  Homeland Security Strategy Act of 2001.  Bill directs the
President to develop a comprehensive strategy for homeland security under which
federal, state, and local government organizations coordinate and cooperate to meet
security objectives.  It directs the President to conduct a comprehensive threat and
risk assessment to identify specific homeland security threats and implement a
resulting strategy as soon as practicable.
 H.R. 3026 (Gibbons).  Office of Homeland Security Act of 2001.  Bill
establishes the Office of Homeland Security within the Executive Office of the
President.  Among other activities, the bill establishes a center within the office to
disseminate information learned from homeland security exercises. 
S. 1449 (Graham); H.R. 3078 (Hastings).  To establish the National Office for
Combating Terrorism.  Bill proposes a National Office for Combating Terrorism
within the Executive Office of the President.  The new office will develop a National
Terrorism Prevention and Response Strategy and coordinate its implementation.  The
office will also oversee state and local government programs and activities as part of
the strategy. 
S. 1453 (Smith).  Preparedness Against Terrorism Act of 2001.  Bill establishes
an Office of National Preparedness within FEMA.  Instructs the executive director to
develop a national strategy for terrorism preparedness and provide technical
assistance to state and localities. 
Grants for Emergency Planning 
H.R. 3161 (Larson).  Municipal Preparation and Strategic Response Act.  Bill
directs FEMA to provide grants to local governments and emergency response units
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to develop plans for coordinated response to emergencies, and to provide grants to
police and fire departments for counterterrorism training.  The bill also requires each
state to have an emergency official serve as a liaison to FEMA.  
Grants for Equipment 
H.R. 1547 (Andrews).  To establish a grant program in the Department of
Defense to assist states and local governments in improving their ability to prevent
and respond to domestic terrorism.  Bill would authorize the Secretary of Defense to
make grants to states and political subdivisions to purchase response equipment. 
H.R. 3025 (Forbes).  To expand the program under which state and local
governments may procure law enforcement equipment through the Department of
Defense to include the procurement of counterterrorism equipment.  Bill expands the
program under which state and local governments procure law enforcement
equipment through the Department of Defense to include the procurement of
counterterrorism equipment. 
Grants for General Preparedness Activities
H.R. 3185 (Green); S. 1617 (Dodd).  Staffing for Adequate Fire and
Emergency Response Act of 2001.  Bill proposes amendments to the Workforce
Investment Act of 1998 authorizing the Secretary of Labor to make matching grants
for up to 75% of the costs of projects to hire firefighters.  States, localities, tribal
organizations, and regional consortia of governments are eligible. 
S. 1737 (Clinton).  Homeland Security Block Grant Act.  Bill creates a block
grant program that would distribute funds to metropolitan cities and counties, and
states.  The funds could be used for a variety of preparedness activities; there would
be minimal application requirements. 
Grants for Preparing for Weapons of Mass Destruction 
H.R. 2333 (Burr).  National Disaster Medical System Act.  Bill establishes the
National Medical Disaster System. It requires such a system to be a coordinated effort
by federal agencies working in collaboration with states. The bill also directs the HHS
Secretary to plan HHS activities to assist state and local governments when state
medical resources are overwhelmed in response to an emergency.  
H.R. 3176 (C. H. Smith).  Hazardous Agent Emergency Uniform Response
Act.  Bill directs the HHS Secretary to develop protocols for responding to public
health emergencies resulting from the release of dangerous biological agents or
chemicals. 
H.R. 3255 (Menendez).  Bioterrorism Preparedness Act (BioPAct) of 2001.
Bill creates grant programs for states and localities to increase hospital and provider
capacity, training, and resources for treating bioterrorism and improve coordination,
training, and equipment of emergency responders.  
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H.R. 3269 (Watson).  To provide for the development of state medical disaster
response plans regarding terrorist attacks that use biological or chemical weapons.
Bill requires the HHS Secretary to develop criteria for state medical disaster plans,
review state plans, and report to Congress.  
H.R. 3458 (Shadegg).  Bill directs the HHS Secretary to contract with a
nonprofit organization for the collection and dissemination of WMD response
material.  Information would be available to state and local officials.  Bill also creates
an emergency medicine alert network for use at the federal and state level. 
S. 1486 (Edwards); H.R. 3242 (Blagojevich).  Biological and Chemical
Weapons Preparedness Act of 2001.  Bill establishes goals for first responder public
health agencies to achieve in responding to biological or chemical attacks.  It also
authorizes block grants and competitive grants to help states and localities achieve
goals and directs HHS Secretary to provide technical assistance and develop
performance measures to evaluate state and local plans.  
S. 1508 (Corzine).  Biological and Chemical Attack Preparedness Act.  Bill
requires states, in consultation with local governments, to develop public health
disaster plans for responding to biological or chemical attacks. Directs the HHS
Secretary to establish standards, approve, and oversee implementation of the plans.
It requires each plan to designate hospitals which will have procedures in place to
treat residents in the event of an attack.  Also requires the Secretary, through the
director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, to award grants to hospitals,
healthcare providers, and State or local government entities to fund the
implementation of preparedness plans. 
S. 1520 (Bayh); H.R. 3153 (Blagojevich).  State Bioterrorism Preparedness
Act.  Bill authorizes the HHS secretary to provide grants to states to improve
preparedness for biological or chemical attacks.  It requires states to submit
preparedness plans to HHS, provides grants to states for training exercises that
simulate terrorist attacks, and directs the HHS Secretary to develop a list of best
practices of states in the area of WMD preparedness.  The bill also proposes the
development of a national emergency communications system.  
S. 1765 (Frist); H.R. 3448 (Tauzin).  Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2001.
Bill creates a block grant for states to develop bioterrorism response plans.  Grant
amounts based on population and states must submit a plan within six months after
receiving funds.  
Intelligence Sharing
H.R. 3285 (Weiner); S. 1615 (Schumer).  Federal-Local Information Sharing
Partnership Act of 2001.  Bill removes legal barriers to allow intelligence officials to
share relevant information with state and local officials.  Also requires state and local




H.R. 3154 (Maloney).  To require the Secretary of Defense to establish at least
one Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team in each State.  Bill requires
the Secretary of Defense to establish at least one National Guard Civil Support Team
(specializing in response to weapons of mass destruction) in each state as well as an
additional team under the direction of the National Guard Bureau.  
